Preserving anonymity and privacy of customer actions within a complex software system, such as a cloud computing system, is one of the main issues to be solved in order to boost private computation outsourcing. In this paper, we propose a coordination paradigm, namely oblivious assignment with m slots of a resource R (with m ≥ 1), allowing processes to compete in order to get a slot of R, while ensuring at the same time both fairness in the resource slots assignment and that no process knows which slot of R is assigned to a process. We study oblivious assignment with m slots solvability issues related to the message pattern of the algorithm. We also present a distributed algorithm solving oblivious assignment with m slots within a distributed systems, assuming the existence of at least two honest processes and m ≤ n (where n is the number of processes). The algorithm is based on a rotating token paradigm and employs an adaptation of the ElGamal encryption scheme to work with multiple parties and ensuring obliviousness of the assignment. Finally, the correctness of the algorithm is formally proved.
Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the problem of oblivious assignment with m slots. Informally, we consider n non-anonymous processes competing for accessing one of the m slots of a resource R. Each slot can be assigned to at most one process at a time. When the process does not need the resource anymore, it releases the slot it owns and the latter can be thus assigned to another requesting process. Note that, processes are utterly identifiable but we strive to protect the allocations of resource slots to processes. Thus, processes are oblivious and in particular they are unaware of assignments between processes and resource slots.
This problem is particularly interesting because it crystallizes the difficulty in coordinating processes that wish to interact with a resource without being noticed by anyone else. Resource sharing environments, channel assignments in telco systems are examples of domains where this problem can be relevant. As an example, an oblivious assignment scheme can help a group of clients of a cloud provider to hide and protect their allocation of resources within a virtualized environment or across distinct domains. Resources can thus be obliviously allocated to clients. Not even the cloud provider is aware of these various assignments.
We target organizations moving to the cloud, or outsourcing their services, that wish to access or allocate virtual resources anonymously. Cryptographic systems, such as fully homomorphic encryption [11] , do not solve the oblivious assignment problem. Homomorphic encryption allows clients to perform computation over encrypted data ensuring that sensitive information remain inaccessible to the cloud provider. Nevertheless, the provider can derive which resources are allocated to which clients. This constitutes a side-channel leak we aspire to prevent. We stress that this type of side-channel has not been considered before in the context of cloud computing.
The paper firstly defines the oblivious assignment with m slots (O-mA) problem. More precisely, if an honest process p i get a slot r j , then no other process is aware of this assignment. We also provide a stronger form of this problem, namely strong oblivious assignment with m slots (SO-mA). In this case, given a process p i , no other process can tell whether any slot was assigned to p i or not. That is, it is not possible to infer whether a specific process is using a resource slot or not. We study solvability issues of O-mA and SO-mA problems related to the message pattern generated by distributed algorithms. This points out that token-based algorithms could implement SO-mA and O-mA. We also show that a trivial perpetual circulating algorithm solves our problem only in the presence of n − 1 honest processes (where n is the number of processes). Thus, we introduce a rotating token distributed algorithm solving O-mA and we assume the existence of at least two honest processes and m ≤ n. The algorithm employs an adaptation of ElGamal encryption scheme to ensure obliviousness of the assignment. Finally, the correctness of the algorithm is formally proved. Let us remark that each non-honest process is able to detect bounds on transmission delays and when they holds. Non-honest process can use this knowledge to infer information about current slot assignments of correct processes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: related work is in Section 2 and the system model is defined in Section 3. Section 4 formalizes the oblivious assignment with m slots problem and provides some solvability conditions, while Section 5 presents a distributed algorithm solving the oblivious assignment problem. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. The proofs omitted in the text and can be found in Appendix A.
Related Work
Defining distributed algorithms for accessing resources in mutual exclusion has been a mainstream field of research in the eighties [18] and several efficient algorithms have been devised (e.g., [19] , [21] , [16] just to cite a few). To facilitate fault tolerance without assuming failure detection, the general mutual exclusion problem has been extended to the k-mutual exclusion one [17] , where at most k different processes can concurrently access the same resource; general strategies working in a failure-free environment have been adapted to solve this more general problem in an asynchronous message passing system (e.g. [14] , [8] ). A different generalization of the mutual exclusion problem, namely k-assignment, has been presented in [9] . In k-assignment there are k < n identical, named resources that may be requested by n processes and the authors shown that the problem can be solved in an asynchronous distributed system, as long as at most k/2 processes can fail.
Similarly, in the renaming problem [3] , each participating process is initially associated to a unique identifier from a large name space and the final objective is to select unique identifiers from a smaller name space. Combining together renaming and k-exclusion, a more general specification, called k-assignment with m slots can be defined [4] . Informally, such a problem requires that at most k processes access concurrently one of the m distinct available slots. All these existing algorithms do not mask the assignment between slots and competing processes. On the contrary, they exploit their knowledge about assignments to minimize the number of exchanged messages.
Generally, the oblivious assignment problem can be solved using multiparty computation [22] . This is a paradigm that allows several parties to evaluate a function f (x 1 , . . . , x n ), or multiple functions, without revealing the inputs x 1 , . . . , x n . That is, every party p i contributes x i but at the end of the protocol it will only learn f (x 1 , . . . x n ) and nothing else. Unfortunately, these generic techniques are notoriously very expensive and call for an exorbitant number of messages to be exchanged. However, there exist more efficient alternatives for many functionalities. The one that is more closely related to the oblivious assignment functionality is referred to as mental poker. Mental poker algorithms [20] allow people to play card games over networks without any trusted dealer. The basic idea is to assign cards to players such that cards stay private and can be safely shuffled. In addition, it is possible to detect cheaters. While the original scheme [20] represented each card with a large number of bits, more recent work [6] makes card sizes smaller and independent of the number of players.
The oblivious assignment problem does not fit completely within the mental poker framework. In our model, we must avoid starvation and ensure liveness and thus allow a process to pick a specific slot of a resource within a fixed amount of time (while this is not possible in mental poker). The release of a resource is also significantly simpler than discarding a card from hand. Indeed, we do not have to preserve the value of the slot (or card) and thus we can just set obliviously a boolean flag.
System Model
The distributed system is composed of a set of n processes Π = {p 1 , p 2 . . . , p n }, each one having a unique identifier, that compete for m distinct slots {r 1 , . . . , r m } of a resource R, where m ≤ n. Each process p i competes to get exclusive access to a slot of R. At any time, each slot can be assigned to at most one process and allocated slots must be released within a finite period of time. Specifically, when process p i needs to acquire one of the m slots of R, it invokes a request() operation and waits until a grantResource() event occurs returning the id of the slot r j assigned to p i . To release the slot r j , p i invokes a release() operation. Processes do not crash.
We assume the existence of a coalition C (with 1 ≤ |C| ≤ n − 2) of honest-but-curious processes [12] . Such processes act according to their algorithm but they can collaborate to acquire and share information about others processes. Processes not belonging to the coalition C are said to be honest, that is, they are correct and behave according to the algorithm and they do not attempt to infer other information, except the ones obtained during the algorithm execution.
Processes coordinate their access to slots of R by exchanging messages. We assume that for any pair of processes p i , p j ∈ Π, there exists a reliable FIFO point-to-point communication channel connecting them. Messages are delivered "most of the time" within δ time units, that is the underlying communication system is synchronous most of the time. However, there could be finite periods of time where the systems behaves as asynchronous. We assume that processes belonging to the coalition C are powerful enough to know both the communication bound δ and if the system is in a synchronus period or not. Such processes can use this knowledge to infer information about other honest processes.
Oblivious Assignment with m Slots
Given a generic resource R, it can be used concurrently by different processes; however, any of its m slot can be used in an exclusive way. Let us remark that every process can always get at most one slot of R, that is, the assignment of multiple slots to a single process is not allowed. At the same time, it must be guaranteed that competing processes will eventually obtain a slot of R. In addition, resource assignment must be kept private.
Problem Definition
The Oblivious assignment with m Slots (O-mA) problem is specified by the following properties:
1. UniqueAssignment : If p i and p j access concurrently the resource R, then the slot r x assigned to p i and the slot r y assigned to p j are distinct.
2. LockoutAvoidance : any process p i that requests access to resource R, eventually is assigned a slot r j of R.
3.
ObliviousAssignment : if a slot r j is assigned to an honest process p i , then no other process is deterministically aware of this assignment.
As an example, consider a distributed system composed by two honest processes, p 1 and p 2 , and n − 2 honest-but-curious processes. Let r 1 and r 2 be two slots of a resource. Suppose that, after a run of the oblivious assignment scheme both processes obtain a slot and only two assignments are possible: (i) p 1 , r 1 , p 2 , r 2 or (ii) p 1 , r 2 , p 2 , r 1 . The ObliviousAssignment property will ensure that the coalition of n − 2 honest-but-curious processes won't be able to determine what was the actual assignment (i.e., whether (i) or (ii) above).
Strong Oblivious Assignment with m Slots (SO-mA)
We consider a stronger variant of the O-mA problem, which is referred to as SO-mA, where it is not possible to determine whether resources are allocated to a specific process. The SO-mA problem can be defined as O-mA by replacing the ObliviousAssignment property with the following one:
StrongObliviousAssignment : Fixed a process p i , no other process can deterministically determine whether p i owns or not any slot of a resource.
In the previous example, the n − 2 honest-but-curious processes may not know what was the actual assignment but they can collectively determine that certain slots were assigned to p 1 and p 2 . This violates the Strong Oblivious Assignment property.
Solvability Issues for O-mA and SO-mA problems
In the following, we will show a necessary condition for an algorithm to solve O-mA and SO-mA. In particular, we will show that there exists constraints on the message pattern that any algorithm must satisfy to solve our problem.
Lemma 1 Let A be an assignment algorithm, ensuring properties 1 and 2, executed by processes in Π. If the message pattern of A expects a process p i ∈ Π to send a request message m to another process p j to acquire a slot and |C| ≥ 1, then A cannot solve O-mA.
Proof Let's consider the following run where p c is a corrupted process: if a process p i sends a message requesting a slot r j to p c , then p c will learn that p i is about to access the slot r j . From this time on p c declares the assignment p i , r j . Due to the fact that A satisfies properties 1 and 2, eventually p i will access the slot and this violates property 3.
2 Lemma 1 Thus, assignment algorithms that are based on explicit permissions for resource allocation cannot solve O-mA and SO-mA. Examples of such algorithms in the context of distributed mutual exclusion are ( [14] , [16] , [17] , [18] ). A class of algorithms that satisfies the necessary condition of Lemma 1 is the one based on a rotating coordinator approach (also called perpetual circulating token [5] , [15] ) as shown in the next section. The following Lemmas show that this simple algorithm implements O-mA and SO-mA only if there is at most one honest-but-curious process..
Lemma 2
Consider an algorithm trivial-A running on the top of the distributed systems described in Section 3 and satisfying properties 1 and 2. If |C| ≥ 2, trivial-A cannot ensure SO-mA property.
Proof Let's consider the following run where two honest-but-curious processes are respectively the predecessor and the successor of an honest process p i in the ring and the communication delay is bounded by δ (see Section 3). When the token reaches p i sent by p i−1 and p i decides to access the slot r j , if p i keeps the slot for an interval of time greater than 2δ then p i−1 and p i+1 will infer deterministically that p i has acquired a slot. This can be accomplished by looking at the timestamps of token messages sent from p i−1 to p i and from p i to p i+1 . This violates the SO-mA property.
2 Lemma 2 The next Lemma follows directly from the previous one:
Lemma 3 Consider a distributed system with a bound δ on message transfer delay and an algorithm trivial-A running on top of it. If m = 1 and |C| ≥ 2, trivial-A cannot ensure O-mA property.
A rotating token algorithm resilient to |C| ≤ n − 2 honest-but-curious processes
Our algorithm is token-based and works in rounds. Each round is led by a coordinator p c that takes care of the token creation, encoding, and dissemination for that specific round. The token circulates on the top of a logical ring formed by the processes (i.e. each process p i passes the token to its neighbor p i+1modn ). Each round is characterized by two phases, allocation phase (corresponding to the management of request() operations), where resource slots are allocated to processes, and release phase, where each process frees its assigned slot once it has done with it. A round ends when all allocated slots are released. The next round is coordinated by the process that follows p c in the logical ring. In the following, we will use the term ticket to indicate a numeric representation of a slot. The coordinator will create n tickets (that is, a ticket per process in the system) regardless of the number of actual slots.
Allocation Phase: The coordinator of the current round creates a token, request token, containing a set of tickets {tk 1 , tk 2 , . . . , tk n }, each one identifying a resource slot. Only m ouf of n tickets will univocally be associated to actual slots of the resource (i.e. valid tickets) while the remaining n − m tickets (i.e. invalid ticket) represent dummy slots. Invalid tickets help prevent leakage of information on actual assignments. At the beginning of each round, the coordinator picks one ticket, encrypts the request token via ElGamal encryption [10] , and forwards the token to the next process in the ring. Upon the receipt of the token, a process p i picks a ticket, re-encrypts the token to make it indistinguishable, and forwards it to the next process in the ring. After getting the ticket, p i will decrypt it by asking other processes for their ephemeral keys: if the ticket is valid and p i requested a slot of R, then it will trigger the grantResource event.
Release Phase: The release phase starts only when the request token returns to the coordinator. The coordinator creates a release token, used to identify the released tickets, and starts to circulate it in the logical ring. A ticket is released by a process p i in two cases: (i) p i did not request a slot of R or, (ii) p i finished with the slot (i.e., when invoking the release() operation). Every time the release token is passed to the next process, it is re-encrypted to avoid information leakage.
The token release token circulates continuously till the coordinator verifies that the number of released tickets is equal to n. At this point, the round is completed and the next process in the ring becomes the new coordinator for a new round.
ElGamal Encryption with Multiple Parties
Notation and Assumptions. In the following, we use y ← f (x) to indicate the assignment to y of the value obtained evaluating a function f over the input x, while we will use y u ← −S to indicate that y is a random element uniformly selected from a set S. In the following, we will assume to have a cyclic subgroup G of prime order q and generator g where the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption [7] holds. Informally, the DDH assumption states that given a triple (g x , g y , g xy ) with x, y u ← −Z q it can be distinguished from a triple in the form (g x , g y , g z ), with z u ← −Z q , by using a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, with negligible probability. For a concrete instantiation, we consider G to be the set of quadratic residues of Z * p where p is a safe prime, i.e., p = 2q + 1 with prime q. A generator g of the group G is simply found by selectingḡ u ← −Z * p and setting g =ḡ 2 mod p wheneverḡ = 1.
ElGamal Encryption. The idea behind ElGamal scheme is to use g xy as a shared secret between sender and recipient. The private key is y u ← −Z q while the public key is the value g y ∈ G. To encrypt an element e ∈ G, it is enough to randomly select an element r u ← −Z q and compute the ciphertext as a pair (c 1 , c 2 ) = (g r , mg ry ) ∈ G × G. The recipient of the ciphertext (c 1 , c 2 ) recovers m by computing c 2 /c y 1 ∈ G. Note that, under the DDH assumption, ElGamal encryption is semantically secure [7] . Intuitively, a semantically secure scheme does not leak any information about the encrypted message. In particular, given a ciphertext (c 1 , c 2 ) of one of two messages m 0 and m 1 , an adversary cannot tell which message was encrypted. This holds even if the adversary chooses both messages, as long as they are both in G.
Adaptation We adapt the ElGamal crypto-system to work with multiple parties. Each process p i has a private key P r key i u ← −Z q , and the corresponding public key is calculated as g P r key i . In addition, p i also maintains the group public key as the value g Y = g p i ∈Π P r key i . We use the ElGamal crypto-system to encrypt tickets whose values contain relevant information about slots of the resource R (e.g. such as network address, memory location, printer ID, etc...). Thus, generic numerical tickets must be mapped into elements of the subgroup G of quadratic residues in Z * p . The standard mapping-then-encrypt procedure works as follows: (i) Consider the ticket t as an element of Z q , (ii) sett = t + 1, and (iii) encrypt the valuet 2 mod p. The decryption phase is more involved: (i) decrypt and recover the plaintextm =t 2 mod p, (ii) compute a square root ofm as m =m (p+1)/4 mod p, and return the ticket m − 1 if m ≤ q, or p − (m − 1) when m > q. In the rest of the paper we assume that tickets or any arbitrary messages are in G, either directly or through the mapping described above.
A ticket t is encrypted for the group of precesses as (g r , tg rY ). Each process must contribute to the decryption phase in order to recover the ticket by computing the partial value g rP r key i . The product modulo p of these partial values from all processes is equal to g rY which is used to recover t as in standard ElGamal. We define a function removeLayer that receives as input a valid ciphertext and removes the component g rP r key i from it, effectively allowing other processes to decrypt the message. This function is executed locally by the process p i .
Notice that, ElGamal ciphertexts can easily be randomized, i.e., given a ciphertext (c 1 , c 2 ) anyone can produce a new ciphertext (c 1 , c 2 ) on the same message without knowing any secret key or learning the message itself. Indeed, given (g r , tg rY ), it is enough to select r * u ← −Z q and compute a new and unlinkable ciphertext (g r+r * , tg (r+r * )Y ). The security of this randomized ElGamal encryption still holds as shown in [13] .
The Algorithm
In this section, we provide the details of the oblivious assignment scheme for our system model. In particular, we first describe the data structures maintained locally by each process p i , then we provide the details about the coordinator selection and the round phases, i.e., the assignment phase and the release phase. Data structures. Each process p i maintains locally the following data structures:
• round i : is an integer representing the round p i is participating in;
• coordinator i : is a boolean variable set to true when p i is the coordinator for the current round, false otherwise;
• state i : is a variable that can be set to {N CS, waiting, CS} and it represents the state of p i ;
• ticket i : is a pair < rd, tk > where tk is an encrypted ticket associated to a slot (whether real or not) and rd essentially reveals the slot identifier;
• P r key i /P b key i : ElGamal private/public keys used to decrypt/encrypt tickets;
• keys i : is a set variable, used in the assignment phase, to store all the temporary keys (i.e. ephemeral keys) needed to decrypt the selected ticket.
Init: (01) round i ← 1; coordinator i ← false; state i ← N CS; releasing i ← true; (02) P r key i ← init private key(p i ); P b key i ← init public key(); --------------------------------------- 
send REQUEST (request token) to p (i+1)modn Figure 1 : The rotating leader protocol (code for p i )
• resource i : is an integer representing the slot id obtained by p i ;
• releasing i : is a boolean flag. It is set to true when p i has no assigned slot of R, false otherwise. In addition, the algorithm also employes two tokens, namely request token and release token. A token is essentially a set containing encrypted tickets and each ticket refers to real or dummy slots.
Round and Coordinator Change. The pseudo-code for the round and coordinator change is shown in Figure 1 . We defined the following functions to simplify the code:
• init private key(p i )/init public key(): initialize p i 's private and public keys.
• reset variables(): reset all variables, except round i , as declared into the Init statement.
• select valid slot({r 1 , r 2 , .., r n }): given the set of (real and dummy) resource slots {r 1 , r 2 , .., r n }, select a real slot.
• select notValid slot({r 1 , r 2 , .., r n }): given the set of (real and dummy) resource slots {r 1 , r 2 , .., r n }, select a dummy slot.
• create request token(r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n−1 ): given the set of (real and dummy) resource slots {r 1 , r 2 , .., r n−1 }, creates a set of tickets and the corresponding request token.
A new round starts as soon as round i is updated (line 04 Figure 1 , line 19 Figure 3 ) and this causes all local variable, except round i , to be reset (line 05). Each process p i checks whether it is a coordinator of the current round. If so, it sets the local coordinator i variable to true (lines 06 -08). This triggers a new assignment phase lead by p i (line 09). The new coordinator checks if it is in the waiting state (line 10) (that is, it is waiting for a slot) and, in that case, it selects a real slot of the resource (lines 11). Otherwise, the coordinator selects a dummy slot (line 12). After the selection, p i creates and encrypts the request token (line 14) and sends it to its "neighbor" p i+1mod (n) (line 15).
The request() operation and the assignment phase. The pseudo-code of the request() operation and the assignment phase is shown in Figure 2 . The functions in the pseudo-code are defined as follows:
else release token ← create release token() (12) release token ← release resource(release token, releasing i , resource i )
ep key i ← generate ephemeral key(P r key i , tk); • shuffle(T ): given a token T , randomly permute the sequence of tickets • randomize token(T ): given token T , re-encrypt each ticket in T • select ticket(T ): return a ticket tk randomly selected and removed from the token T .
• generate ephemeral key(tk): given a ticket tk =< rd,r j >, generate a temporary key (also called ephemeral) starting from the number rd included in tk, that can be used to decrypt the slot idr j .
• decodeElement(tk, {k 1 , k 2 . . . k j }): given a set of keys {k 1 , k 2 . . . k j } and a ticket tk, decrypt tk and return its cleartext value
• create release token(): create the release token to collect released tickets.
• release resource(T, b, r j ): given a token T , a boolean value b, and a slot r j , process the token T according to the boolean value b. In particular, if b is true then the slot r j is released otherwise the function does nothing.
When a process p i needs a slot of R, it invokes the request() operation. The variable state i is thus set to waiting (line 01). When the request token is delivered to p i , it checks if it is the coordinator for this round (line 02). If p i is not the coordinator, then it means that the assignment phase for this round is still running and a ticket can be chosen from the token. The selection consists of three steps: token shuffling (line 04) , token re-randomization (line 05) and finally ticket selection (line 06). Once a ticket has been selected, it has to be decrypted to recover the slot id. For this purpose, p i sends a GET EPHEMERAL KEY message to other processes (lines 08 -10). If p i is the coordinator, then all slots have been assigned for the current round and a release phase should start (line 11 -14) . Hence, p i creates the release token (line 11), and embeds its encrypted releasing i flag into the token (line 12). Finally, the token is passed to p i+1mod n (line 13).
When a process p i receives a GET EPHEMERAL KEY(j, tk) message, it generates a temporary key that can only be used to decrypt the ticket tk (line 16) and returns it to p j When all ephemeral keys are available (line 20), then p i decrypts the ticket, recovers the slot id 21, and use the slot in case is a real one (lines 22 -25).
The release() operation and the release phase. The pseudo-code of the request() operation and the assignment phase is shown in Figure 3 . (13) else release token ← create release token() (14) release token ← release resource(release token, releasing i , resource i ); In the pseudo-code, we used release resource(T, b) and randomize token(T ) defined earlier and we use the following new functions:
• remove layer(T ): given an encrypted release token T , removes the encrypted layer of p i • isFree(T ): given a token T , check if each slot in the release token T has been released.
A slot is released by calling the release() operation. In this case, the variable state i is set to N CS and the flag releasing i is set to true (lines 01 -02). When p i receives release token, it checks whether it is the coordinator for the current round. If p i is not the coordinator, according to its state, it releases or keeps the assigned slot (line 05), it re-randomizes the token (line 06), removes its encryption layer (line 07), and finally passes the token to its neighbor in the logical ring (line 08). If p i is the coordinator for the current round, then it checks whether all other processes released their assigned slots (lines 09 -16). If all slots were released, then p i sends a NEW ROUND message to its neighbor so that a new round can be started (line 12). Otherwise, the current token is discarded and a new turn of the release phase is started (lines 13 -16) . Finally, when a process p i receives a NEW ROUND message, it updates the local variable round i and forwards the NEW ROUND message to its neighbor (lines 19 -22) .
Correctness Proofs. Due to lack of space, we provide here only the statements of the main Lemmas. Proof of lemma 6 can be found in Appendix A while the other proofs can be found in [1] . Π = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n } be the set of processes of the distributed system and let {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m } be the set of slots of the resource R. Given the algorithm shown in Figures 1 -3 and given two processes p i , p j ∈ Π, if p i and p j access concurrently the resource R, then the slot r x assigned to p i and the slot r y assigned to p j are distinct.
Lemma 4 Let
Lemma 5 Let Π = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n } be the set of processes of the distributed system and let {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m } be the slots of the resource R. Given the algorithm shown in Figures 1 -3 , then any process p i that invokes the request() operation will eventually obtain a slot r j of R.
Lemma 6 Let Π = {p 1 , p 2 . . . p n } be the set of processes of the distributed system and let {r 1 , r 2 , . . . r m } be the slots of the resource R. Given the algorithm shown in Figures 1 -3 , if |C| ≤ n − 2 then the O-mA property is satisfied.
Discussion
Improving resource utilization: The algorithm might suffer in some runs from poor resource utilization, that is, a competing process (apart from the coordinator) may not obtain a valid slot even if there are several available. This impossibility leads to some utilization waste due to the non-deterministic behavior. Suppose the first competing process p i is m hops away from the coordinator. It may happen that all m slots are assigned to the intermediate processes, i.e., those between the coordinator and p i . However, intermediate processes may not necessarily compete for slots but they still get valid tickets. To avoid such a waste and improve resource utilization, we envision executing concurrent rounds with multiple coordinators. The idea is to let coordinators start new rounds as soon as slots become available. There could be up to m concurrent rounds in which each slot is managed by a distinct coordinator.
Comparison with an algorithm based on a Trusted Third Party: In Appendix A we considered an algorithm based on a fair Trusted Third Party (TTP) that regulates access to the slots. Each process sends a request to access a slot of R to the TTP. The TTP assigns one of the m slots, if available, and sends a reply to the process. We proved a bound on the maximum number of honest-but-curious processes (i.e., |C| ≤ n − 2) that can be tolerated by the TTP algorithm to solve O-mA. Intuitively, the communication bound δ creates an information leakage that can be exploited by a coalition C with |C| = n − 1 processes. Processes in C may collude and issue requests at exactly the same time to the TTP. If the resource is not allocated by the TTP to a honest-but-curious process within the time bound, then it's possible to infer that the honest process has received one slot. Such a slot can also be uniquely identified which implies that O-mA is violated.
This bound matches the one found in Lemma 6. Thus our algorithms has the same resiliency to honestbut-curious processes as the one based on a TTP.
Adapting the algorithm to satisfy SO-mA: Our basic scheme does not provide the SO-mA property. Indeed, if the round leader belongs to C, it will figure out the number of processes that are using any slots of the resource. This is enough to violate, in some runs, the SO-mA property. It is possible to avoid this leakage by modifying the release phase implementing a secure − or of the internal states of the processes. In particular, secure-or will return 1 if there is at least one process in CS (critical section) state, false otherwise. But the number of processes in CS state is kept private. The secure-or can be implemented by simply exploiting the homomorphic property of ElGamal encryption. We will investigate further this idea in future work.
Towards Byzantine Adversaries: Our protocol assumes honest but curious adversaries, i.e., processes will faithfully follow the specifications of the protocol but are tempted to learn anything outside their domain. On the other hand, malicious or byzantine adversaries can actively and arbitrarily disrupt the protocol. For example, a byzantine adversary could inject, modify, or corrupt messages. In addition, the adversary can be adaptive in the sense that while disrupting the protocol it will adapt its attack strategy to render countermeasures ineffective. Designing an oblivious assignment scheme resilient against such a powerful attacker is still an open problem. However, we believe there exist technical tools that can be used to convert our basic scheme for honest-but-curious adversaries into a scheme resilient against byzantine adversaries. Inevitably, these tools will make our scheme substantially more expensive. In particular, it's possible to prevent injection of spurious messages via insubvertible encryption [2] , that is, ciphertexts can still be randomized as in our scheme but no adversary can inject ciphertexts not produced by the round leader. At the same time, no existing ciphertext can be corrupted unless it is a legitimate re-randomization. The correctness of other operations such as partial decryption or release of tickets can be performed via standard zero-knowledge proofs. Such proofs are reasonably efficient in our setting. We leave the details of this approach to future work.
Conclusion
This paper introduced the oblivious assignment problem, i.e., a coordination problem, where n processes compete to get exclusive access to one of the m available slots of a resource R, while still maintaining the obliviousness of the assignment. A rotating token algorithm solving the oblivious assignment problem has been introduced. This algorithm has been proven correct as long as at least two honest processes are in the distributed system. This bound matches the one proved considering a centralized TTP assigning slots. All these results consider that honest-but-curious processes know both when the communication delay is within a certain bound and the value of the bound. This knowledge can be exploited to break the algorithm (i.e. discover assignments of correct processes).
Appendix A -Third Party Impossibilities and Proof Omitted in the text
Third Party Impossibilities
To state and prove solvability results, we introduce a Trusted Third Party (T T P ) that manages the assignment. Each process sends a request to access a slot of R to the T T P . The T T P assigns one of the m resource, if available, and sends the reply to the process. To ensure SO-mA, the number of resources m has to be greater than the number of processes in C. To see this, consider the case where the T T P assigns all slots to processes in C. Clearly, in this case, processes in C can collectively determine that honest processes do not own any slot. For this reason, whenever we refer to the SO-mA problem, we implicitly assume that m > |C|.
Lemma 7
Consider an asynchronous system, with a trusted third party T T P , composed of n processes and m slot of a resource R, where m < n. Assume T T P is running an assignment algorithm that ensures properties 1 and 2. If |C| < n, then T T P solves both the O-mA and SO-mA problems.
Proof To violate the StrongObliviousAssignment property, processes in C must deterministically determine whether honest processes own slots or not. The only information leakage, however, is the acknowledgment from the T T P when a slot is requested. Due to the communication asynchrony, a process in C waiting for an acknowledgement message from the T T P cannot establish whether all slots have been assigned or there is an unpredictable message delay.
2 Lemma 7 Lemma 8 Consider a distributed system, with a trusted third party T T P , composed of n processes with a bound δ on message transfer delay and m slots of a resource R, where m < n. Assume T T P is running an assignment algorithm that ensures properties 1 and 2 and whose response time for each T T P assignment operation is bounded by δ . If |C| ≥ n − 1, then T T P cannot solve the O-mA problem.
Proof In the synchronous system model, a process is able to compute a bound on the time elapsed between a slot request to the TTP and the time the reply is received. This bound is 2δ + δ . Consider an adversary A that coordinates the processes in C. A instructs the processes in C to issue m requests to the T T P . If any of them does not obtain a slot r j within 2δ + δ , it means that r j has been assigned to an honest process, say p i . Thus, A infers the assignment p i , r j , violating the ObliviousAssignment property.
Lemma 9 Consider a distributed system, with a trusted third party T T P , composed of n processes with a bound δ on message transfer delay and m slots of a resource R, where m < n. Assume T T P is running an assignment algorithm that ensures properties 1 and 2 and whose response time for each T T P assignment operation is bounded by δ . Finally, let w be an integer (with 1 ≤ w ≤ m) representing the maximum number of slots of R concurrently assigned by T T P . If w ≥ n − |C| and w is fixed, then T T P cannot solve the SO-mA problem.
Proof Assume that w ≥ |Π \ C|. We show that there exists an execution of the protocol that violates the StrongObliviousAssignment property. Let us define d = w − (n − |C|). This is the number of available slots when all honest processes have already obtained a slot. Since w ≤ m and m ≤ n − 1, we have that d is at most |C| − 1. Consider an adversary A that coordinates the processes in C. A instructs d + 1 processes in C to issue requests to the T T P at time t 0 (note that d + 1 ≤ |C|). In the synchronous system model, a process is able to compute a bound on the time elapsed between a slot request to the TTP and the time the reply is received. This bound is 2δ + δ . Thus, at time t 0 + 2δ + δ , the adversary learns how many slots have been assigned to d + 1 processes of C. 
Proofs omitted in the text
Lemma 4 Let Π = {p 1 , p 2 . . . p n } be the set of processes of the distributed system and let {r 1 , r 2 , . . . r m } be the set of slots of the resource R. Given the algorithm shown in Figures 1 -3 and given two processes p i , p j ∈ Π, if p i and p j access concurrently the resource R, then the slot r x assigned to p i and the slot r y assigned to p j are distinct.
Proof We prove this lemma by contradiction. Assume that r x = r y . Thus, p i and p j executed line 26, Figure 2 and resource i is equal to resource j . The latter implies that there exist two tickets ticket i and ticket j that store the same encrypted value. But this is a contradiction. Note that, processes obtain tickets by selecting them from the request token (line 10, Figure 2 ) and the request token is created by the coordinator of the current round at the beginning of the assignment phase (line 14, Figure1). But the request token does not contain duplicates and resource slots are distinct, thus there can be only one ticket associated to r x (or r y ).
Lemma 10 Give the algorithm shown in Figures 1 -3 , then every round eventually terminates.
Proof The proof is done by induction. Let us first prove that from round 1, eventually all the processes will move to round 2 and then we will show that the same happens also in a generic round i. Basic step: round 1. Round 1 starts with the Init statement where all local variables are initialized to their default values (lines 01 -02, Figure 1 ) and the coordinator for the current round is selected (line 07). Note that, since process identifiers are unique, in each round, a unique coordinator is selected by using the deterministic function modn (where n is the number of processes of the distributed system). In particular, when executing this procedure at round 1, p 1 will set its coordinator 1 to true ((line 07)), and the assignment phase starts with the send of the REQUEST message (line 18), containing the token to p 2 . Delivering such message, p 2 will forward it to p 3 and so on, until the REQUEST message come back to p 1 . Note that, since processes communicate through reliable FIFO point-to-point channels and a failure free scenario is assumed, then eventually the request token come back to p 1 and the release phase starts. In particular, p 1 will create a release token and will send it to p 2 trough a TOKEN RELEASE message (line 13). Delivering the TOKEN RELEASE message, p 2 will execute line 08 forwarding the release token to p 3 and so on, until also the release token come back to p 1 . Delivering the TOKEN RELEASE message, p 1 will check if all the slots have been released (line 09, Figure 3 ). If it is so, then p 1 will set its local variable coordinator 1 to false (line 10, Figure 3 ), it will increments its round counter to 2, i.e. it will goes to round 2 (line 11, Figure 3 ) and it will send a new round message to p 2 that delivering it will execute lines 19 -22, Figure 3 going to the second round as well. In addition, p 2 will also execute lines 04 -08, Figure 3 and will become the new coordinator.
On the contrary, if there exists some process that still own a slot of the resource R, then p 1 will circulate again a new release token in the ring (lines 13 -16, Figure 3 ). Note that, since all the processes follows the protocol, eventually all of them will release the assigned slot and then eventually the condition in line 09 will become true and a new round will be triggered.
Induction step: round i. Note that, moving from a generic round i−1 to the current round i, the coordinator of the round i − 1 send a new round message that will circulate in the logical ring. As a consequence, every process p j delivering such a message will execute lines 18 -22, Figure 3 updating their round j local variable. As a consequence, every p j will execute lines 04 -08, Figure 1 re-initializing its local variables, coming back to the scenario described in the basic step and the claim follows.
2 Lemma 10 Corollary 1 Give the algorithm shown in Figures 1 -3 , then every process p i ∈ Π will become coordinator infinitely often.
Proof Due to Lemma 10, every round eventually terminates and the round counter is incremented. Considering that (i) the number of processes n is finite and (ii) the coordinator is the process p j such that j = round mod n , it means that every process p i will become coordinator once every n rounds. 2 Corollary 1
Lemma 5 Let Π = {p 1 , p 2 . . . p n } be the set of processes of the distributed system and let {r 1 , r 2 , . . . r m } be the slots of the resource R. Given the algorithm shown in Figures 1 -3 , then any process p i that invokes the request() operation, eventually obtains a slot r j of R.
Proof Suppose by contradiction that there exists a process p i ∈ Π that invokes the request() operation at some time t and it never obtains a slot of R. In this case, p i never executes line 14, Figure 1 or line 26, Figure 2 . When p i invokes the request() operation, it executes line 01, Figure 2 and sets the variable state i to waiting. Due to Corollary 1, p i will become coordinator at some time t after t and its coordinator i variable will be set to true. Thus, the procedure in lines 09 -18, Figure 1 is executed and, in particular, the condition in line 10 p i will be satisfied. But this implies that a valid slot will be assigned to p i by executing line 11.
2 Lemma 5 Lemma 6 Let Π = {p 1 , p 2 . . . p n } be the set of processes of the distributed system and let {r 1 , r 2 , . . . r m } be the slots of the resource R. Given the algorithm shown in Figures 1 -3 , if |C| ≤ n − 2 then the O-mA property is satisfied.
We divide the proof of Lemma 6 in two subproofs.
Lemma 7
If |C| ≤ n − 2, then the O-mA property is satisfied during the assignment phase.
We consider the worst case scenario in which a non-adaptive adversary A compromises n − 2 processes. Let p i and p j be the two honest processes. We will show that if A is able to guess the correct assignment of p i and p j with probability better than To formalize our proof, we define the Correct Assignment Indistinguishability Experiment (CAIE):
• The adversary A outputs the set of processes C to be compromised.
• An assignment phase is run. At the end of it, the adversary A is provided with a transcript L of all messages exchanged and, in addition, the memory content of all processes in C.
• The adversary A outputs a guess a =< p i , r k >, < p j , r t >.
• The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if a is the correct assignment of slots for p i , p j , 0 otherwise.
Recall that A embodies honest-but-curious processes, and thus cannot inject or manipulate messages but must faithfully follow the algorithm specifications. We want to show that the probability that A outputs the correct guess is 1/2 plus a negligible function in the security parameter.
Lemma 8 Under the DDH assumption in G, the probability that A wins in CAIE is ≤ 1/2 + negl(k).
Proof We fix an adversary A and set |P r[CAIE A (k) = 1] − 1/2| = (k). We build an adversary A that uses A to violate the semantic security of ElGamal encryption. The adversary A obtains a public key g y i and plays the CPA-security game [12] . In this game, A generates two challenge messages of the same length and receives the encryption of one of them. A must guess which message was encrypted.
We build A as follows:
• A starts A and obtains C.
• A sets g y i as public key of p i . We assume w.l.o.g. that 1 < i < j and that the leader is p 1 . A simulates an assignment phase for A and generates a transcript L. It is easy to see that, even though A does not know the secret key of p i , the simulation is perfect and the transcript L is correct. Indeed, A knows the actual content of encrypted tickets and can respond to decryption queries (via ephemeral keys).
A picks two encrypted tickets t 0 = (g r , r 0 g rY ), t 1 = (g r , r 1 g r Y ) uniformly at random from the token entering p i . It then sets (r 0 , r 1 ) as the challenge messages in the CPA-game. A receives the response to the challenge (g r , r b g ry i ), and embeds the ticket t = (g r , r b g ry i g r ∀p k ∈Π\{p i } y k ) into the token exiting from p i . A cannot respond to decryption query of t . If in the transcript L a process in C selects t , A stops the execution of A, it aborts, and restarts the simulation.
• A outputs its guess a. If p i is paired with t 0 , A outputs 0, otherwise A outputs 1.
A runs in polynomial time and wins whenever A wins in the CAIE experiment. Since ElGamal is semantically secure, it must be that (k) = negl(k) and this proves the Lemma.
2 Lemma 8 The lemma 7 follows directly from lemma 8, the experiment CAIE is well defined for more than two honest parties. The adversary A can use an adversary A that breaks CAIE with more than two honest processes to break the ElGamal encryption with multiple messages. A creates two possible assignments of tickets to the k honest processes a 0 = (r 0 , r 1 , .., r k−1 ), a 1 = (r 0 , r 1 , .., r k−1 ) and use A to distinguish the encryption of one of these two assignments under an unknown private key.
